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ABSTRACT
The progress of deep learning (DL), especially the recent
development of automatic design of networks, has brought
unprecedented performance gains at heavy computational
cost. On the other hand, blockchain systems routinely perform
a huge amount of computation that does not achieve practical
purposes in order to build Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus
from decentralized participants. In this paper, we propose a
new consensus mechanism, Proof of Learning (PoLe), which
directs the computation spent for consensus toward opti-
mization of neural networks (NN). In our mechanism, the
training/testing data are released to the entire blockchain
network (BCN) and the consensus nodes train NN models
on the data, which serves as the proof of learning. When the
consensus on the BCN considers a NN model to be valid, a
new block is appended to the blockchain. We experimentally
compare the PoLe protocol with Proof of Work (PoW) and
show that PoLe can achieve a more stable block generation
rate, which leads to more efficient transaction processing. We
also introduce a novel cheating prevention mechanism, Secure
Mapping Layer (SML), which can be straightforwardly im-
plemented as a linear NN layer. Empirical evaluation shows
that SML can detect cheating nodes at small cost to the
predictive performance.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Security protocols; • Information
systems → Computing platforms.
KEYWORDS
Blockchain, Consensus Mechanism, Proof of Work, Deep
Learning
1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, significant performance gain in deep learning has
been derived from scaling up the network and training data
[4, 14, 16, 23] and automatic design of neural network (NN)
architectures [17, 20, 26]. These trends have created an ever-
growing demand for computational power. For example, the
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largest GPT-2 model [16] has a total of 1,542 million param-
eters. The evolution of the transformer model from [20] re-
quired 32,623 TPU hours or 2,192,960 P100 GPU hours. Such
compute requirements render model optimization unrealistic
for academic researchers and even small-sized enterprises and
hinder wide adoption of artificial intelligence technologies.
The energy consumption leaves large carbon footprint and
non-negligible environmental impact [21].
A blockchain network (BCN) is a decentralized distributed
system where participants do not trust each other but are
able to collectively maintain a consistent database or ledger.
Pioneered by the Bitcoin system [15], BCN is now used
in novel financial services such as crytocurrency and smart
contracts. It has also been envisioned to have major roles in
applications that require permanent and tampering-resistant
data storage.
However, a major drawback of BCN is that, due to the
Proof-of-Work (PoW) mechanism that builds consensus from
distrustful nodes, it consumes massive amount of compute
and energy. According to the Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity
Consumption Index1, at the time of writing, the annualized
electricity consumption of Bitcoin mining exceeds that of
Austria. Most of the energy is spent on calculating the nonce
of hash functions, which serves no real purposes other than
being difficult to compute. In this paper, we direct the com-
putation and energy spent on blockchain consensus to the
practical function of training machine learning models.
A consensus mechanism on the BCN specifies how the
participants determine an increment to the data ledger, or
a block, is valid. Only vaid blocks are added to the ledger.
Therefore, the consensus mechanism is key to the consistency
and integrity of the ledger. In the popular Proof-of-Work
(PoW) mechanism, participants compete to solve an asym-
metric hash puzzle that is difficult to solve but easy to verify.
One solution is a nonce 𝑥 whose hash ℎ𝑥 begins with a spe-
cific number of zeros [3]. Once the nonce is found, other
participants can easily verify if the solution is correct. The
problem solver is then allowed to append a new block to the
blockchain. Later blocks on the chain contain the hash of the
previous block. Tampering with an old block hence requires
regenerating all subsequent blocks, which is prohibitively
expensive.
Similar to PoW, the proposed Proof-of-Learning (PoLe)
consensus mechanism contains two main constituents: an
assymetric puzzle and a tampering prevention technique that
links adjacent blocks. For the assymmetric puzzle, we rely
1https://www.cbeci.org/
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on the non-convex optimization of large neural networks,
based on the realization that it is NP-hard to find a set
of network weights that achieve a given training accuracy,
but easy to verify if a given set of weights can achieve a
given training or test accuracy. For tampering prevention, we
propose a functional encryption scheme, whose decryption
can be implemented as a linear layer in the neural network
called the Secure Mapping Layer (SML). The SML projects
input feature vectors onto specific directions that depend
on the hash of the previous block. This technique prevents
participants from reusing exsting solutions in order to gain
unfair advantages. Furthermore, it allows the PoLe BCN, in
the absense of useful machine learning work, to gracefully
degrade to PoW by repeatedly commission machine learning
tasks for the sole purpose of new block generation.
The proposed PoLe-based BCN provides a platform on
which users may commission a neural network model that
meet their requirements. The BCN contains two types of
participants, data nodes, which announce tasks with a re-
ward, and consensus nodes or miners, which work to solve
announced tasks. After a data node announces a task, con-
sensus nodes may accept it and seek a model that meets
the announced minimum training accuracy. After receiving a
valid solution, which meets the training accuracy criterion,
the data node releases the test set. The consensus nodes then
collectively select the solution with the highest generalization
performance and distribute the reward accordingly. Thus, a
PoLe-based blockchain can serve as a decentralized database
and a machine-learning platform simultaneously.
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
∙ We propose a new consensus algorithm on blockchain
called Proof of Learning (PoLe), which channels the
otherwise wasted computational power to the practical
purpose of training neural network models.
∙ In order to maintain the integrity of the blockchain
ledger, we propose a data encryption scheme that uses
a linear NN layer to link adjacent blocks together.
Empirical evidence shows that the encryption detects
tampering behavior without significantly degrading
predictive performance.
∙ We provide a mechanism design that encourages two
types of participants, data nodes and consensus nodes,
to collaborate, while the consensus nodes compete
among themselves. The mechanism rewards the con-
sensus nodes for the best generalization performance.
2 RALATED WORK
2.1 Blockchain and Consensus Mechanisms
The technology of blockchain is a distributed paradigm to
boost the internet of value [22], which has gained tremen-
dous momentum in the past decade. Blockchain enables dis-
tributed parties who do not fully trust each other to maintain
a shared and consistent ledger. Blockchain networks (BCNs)
are distinguished by unique characteristics including decen-
tralization, traceability, transparency, tampering-resistance,
and programmability [5].
Consensus algorithm is a method to achieve data consis-
tency among multiple distributed nodes. The most classical
and commonly used consensus algorithm is proof of work
(PoW) proposed in Bitcoin white paper [15], which was ever
proposed in filtering spam. In the Bitcoin network, the PoW
algorithm lets each node repeatedly generate nonces when
“mining” a valid block, until the hash value calculated by
the nonce and content of the current and previous blocks
less than a target value is worked out, which will be used as
the hash value of the current block. The blockchain model
always considers the longest blockchain to be effective. When
a node wants to modify the content of a previous block and
make this content effective, it needs to recalculate the hash
value of all blocks after that block and make the length of
the modified blockchain longer than the unmodified chain.
The computational power required by this process will be
prohibitively high, which guarantees the data security and
data consistency of the blockchain systems.
Motivated to reduce the compute demand of PoW, proof
of stake (PoS) [11] and distributed proof of stake (DPoS) [13]
have been proposed as alternatives to PoW. PoS dynamically
adjusts the PoW calculation difficulty of each node according
to the amount and time of tokens held by different nodes,
so as to form a situation where the nodes with more token
ages are more likely to take the lead in calculating available
blocks. Although PoS reduces the need for compute, it places
trust in participants with a large amount of tokens, which
may collude to become centers and arbitrators of the network.
Centralization may erode trust in the fairness of the consensus.
This concern may have played a role in the slow transition of
the Ethereum platform, which is attempting to transit from
PoW to PoS.
Other alternative consensus mechanisms such as credit-
based PoW [9], proof of reputation (PoR) [27] and proof
of negotiation (PoN) [6], have been also proposed in the
literature. PoR studies a two-chain architecture to construct
the reputation of nodes in a separate chain and the next
block generator is determined by the reputation chain [27].
In PoN, the trustworthiness of miners are evaluated and a
random-honest miner is selected based on negotiation rules.
The PoN investigates parallel multi-block creation method to
achieve high efficiency than traditional consensus mechanisms
in one-by-one block creation [6]. To date, PoW remains the
most popular and widely accepted choice [7].
Replacing hash calculation, the analog Hamiltonian opti-
misers based PoW is proposed in [10] such that the blockchain
system can generate blocks in seconds to save energy. Some
afforts have been made to direct the computational power in
Bitcoin to scientific computing, such as Primecoin2. In Prime-
Coin network, a prime PoW is designed to generates a special
form of prime number chains of interest to mathematical
research. In this work, we aims to apply the computational
resources in PoW in a general case of deep learning model
training.
2https://primecoin.io/about.php
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Figure 1: The Overview of the Proposed System
2.2 Federated Learning
The proposed blockchain system bears some resemblance to
federated learning [12, 24], where various participants with
different data collaborate in a secure and privacy-preserving
manner to train one model. However, when compared with
conventional settings of federated learning, the proposed sys-
tem differs in important ways, including (1) competition
versus collaboration among the participants, and (2) assump-
tion of the participants’ intentions.
The first difference lies in the way computational nodes
work. In federated learning, multiple computational nodes
collaborate to train a machine learning model, often by ag-
gregating model updates after a number of iterations [12].
In comparison, the PoLe setup pits the miners against each
other and let them compete for the best generationalization
performance. Although collaboration arguably provides bet-
ter computational efficiency, the advantage of blockchain is
that it can serve as a decentralized database system, which
is uniquely beneficial.
The second major difference is the assumptions regarding
the participants’ intentions. Despite some exceptions (e.g.,
[8]), federated learning usually assumes the computing nodes
are honest but curious [2] and hence do not provide explicit
verification of the output of the computing nodes. In contrast,
the blockchain system assumes the consensus nodes are moti-
vated to cheat. The blockchain is designed with mechanisms
to verify outputs from nodes and to maintain system integrity
and consistency even when attacked.
3 THE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The proposed system is a decentralized peer-to-peer network
composed by two types of entities: data nodes and consensus
nodes. Communication between nodes are secured via public-
private asymmetric encryption schemes and happens in the
form of blocks being broadcast to the entire network. Figure
1 shows the system architecture. A data node is a user who
commissions machine learning tasks via the blockchain. The
consensus nodes are the suppliers of the computational power
to the system; they compete to train a model that meets
the requirements as specified by the data node. The winner
consensus node receives the reward specified by the data
node. Besides rewards from data nodes, the blockchain also
functions as a decentralized data store such as those used by
cryptocurrencies. In the following sections, we describe the
two types of nodes in detail.
3.1 Data Node
Data nodes are entities who commission machine learning
tasks to the computational nodes, or consensus nodes. A task
issued by a data node contains training dataset, a specifi-
cation of the desired machine learning model, a minimum
accuracy, and a reward. The training dataset is encrypted
(see section 3.4) and stored in blocks. A task request contains
hash pointers to the training set, but not the test set. At the
time of request, the task is broadcast to the entire network
and added to the global task list. The global task list is an
important content in the latest consensused block (previous
one of the current block). The reward is immediately trans-
ferred from the data node’s account to a virtual reservoir
account, which will pay the winning consensus node with the
best generalization performance.
The model specification includes a full specification of net-
work architecture such as the number and types of layers and
their interconnections, but may leave out hyperparameters
used for training, such as the learning rate or the weight
decay coefficient. The model specification should be suffi-
ciently detailed so that one can perform inference based on
the specification from a complete set of model parameters.
The specification also includes an accuracy metric, a mini-
mum training accuracy that must be achieved, and a time
limit for training.
The test set should remain off the blockchain in order to
prevent malicious consensus nodes from using the test set
for training. Therefore, the data node only broadcasts the
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test set after it starts to receive trained models. The data
node can decide to wait for a number of solutions to arrive
before releasing the test set. After the test set is released, no
solutions from consensus node will be accepted. This is en-
sured through checking against the timestamp of the test set
block. Data nodes will sign the timestamp to prevent forgery.
Although nodes in a distributed system may not have per-
fectly synchronized clocks, the time discrepancy is far smaller
than the time it takes to train a machine learning model [18].
The test data for each task is stored in the current block
for which consensus nodes have competatively contributed
their computational power in training the corresponding task.
With the pointers of the test dataset in the block header, any
nodes receiving the new block can evaluate its validity based
on the proposed block verification algorithm, and append
the valid block in their blockchain based on which the node
mines the next block.
3.2 Consensus Nodes and the PoLe Consensus
Consensus nodes, also called miners, are suppliers of com-
putational power to the network. The miners compete to
perform model training tasks issued by data nodes and are
rewarded as a result. The behavior of the consensus nodes
follow the Proof-of-Learning consensus algorithm which is
described as in Algorithm 1.
When idle, a consensus node selects the task with highest
value from the task list in the last block in its blockchain,
which represents the best consensus known by this node, and
begins training the task. The value of a task is determined
by the average reward in a unit of time. Since the task list is
consistent, the highest value task should be the same for all
the miners. Next, it performs several maintenance steps (Line
2-4) such as collecting data according to the task description
and initializing the model parameters and create the secure
mapping layer (SML, see Section 3.4) which transforms the
data in ciphertext to proper input feature vectors. Since the
generation of SML is related with the current block hash, the
malicious nodes are unable to start mining in advance.
After that, the miner optimizes the specified machine
learning model using a method of its choice (Line 7). When
training has produced a model that meets the minimum
training accuracy, the miner broadcasts a new block declaring
its success (Line 8-14).
Before a miner completes its own training, it may receive
other new blocks from other miners who claim to have com-
pleted the task properly. If the miner has not received the test
dataset, it saves these blocks and continues training (Line
15-18). If test data have been released before it completes the
training task, the miner understands it losses the competition
in this block height and terminates its training (Line 19-22).
The miner will terminate its training session and broadcast
its new block for one of several reasons: (1) the miner has
found a model that achieves the minimum training accuracy;
(2) the maximum time allowed for training has been reached,
or (3) miner has received the test dataset, indicating no
further model solutions would be accepted. Once a training
Algorithm 1: The PoLe Consensus Algorithm
Input: task_list: the task list stored in previous block
blk_chain: the blockchain
PHS: the hash value of the previous block
1 task ← PopMostValuable ( task_list )
2 train_data ← CollectData ( task.data_pointers )
3 SMLayer ← CreateSMLayer(PHS)
4 sm_model ← InsertLayer(task.model, SMLayer)
5 received_blks ← []
6 while t < time_max do
7 train sm_model for one step
8 calculate train_accuracy
9 if train_accuracy ≥ task.required_accuracy then
10 blk ← CreateBlock(sm_model)
11 broadcast blk to other consensus nodes
12 Append(received_blks, blk)
13 break
14 end
15 if received a new solution blk then
16 Append(blk_chain, blk)
17 break
18 end
19 if received the test data block then
20 break
21 end
22 t++
23 end
24 blk ← CreateBlock(sm_model)
25 broadcast blk to other consensus nodes
26 new_blks ← WaitAndReceiveBlocks()
27 received_blks ← Append(received_blks, new_blks)
28 received_blks ← Append(received_blks, blk)
29 sort received_blks in descending order of test_accuracy
30 for each blk in received_blks do
31 if VerifyBlock(blk, PHS, train_data, test_blk) =
True then
32 Append(blk_chain, blk)
33 return
34 end
35 end
task is completed before a test dataset is received, the trained
model is packed in a new block and then broadcast to all
other consensus nodes (Line 24-25). After consensus nodes
receive a series of blocks and end up receiving test data (Line
26-28), they first compare the test accuracy of these blocks
and sort them in a descending order of the test accuracy
(Line 29). Then, miners evaluate the validity of each block
according to Algorithm 2 (Line 31). A block firstly passes the
verification process when Algorithm 2 returns true, then the
block become the winning block(Line 31-34). The remaining
blocks satisfying the requirement become ommer blocks (i.e.,
uncle/aunt blocks) as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Validating and Adding Blocks to the Blockchain
When a new block is accepted as a winning block, the
test data is then appended in the body of the block and
the rewards of the task is transferred to the block owner.
The task list in the new block is formed by subtracting the
completed task from the original list in the previous block
and adding the newly collected tasks. Consensus nodes will
consider the transactions contained in the winning block to
be valid and generate new blocks by attempting the next task
from the task list of the winning block. The whole network
will only admit the transaction in the winning block. The
next winning blocks can get additional rewards by referring
these ommer blocks, and the producer of the ommer block
can also get rewards. The detail design of the rewards and
incentives is presented in Section 3.5
The winning block and ommer blocks are then appended
to the miner’s blockchain. Figure 2 shows the whole process
of collecting blocks, verifying blocks, comparing blocks and
adding blocks to the blockchain.
Algorithm 2 shows how a received block is verified. Before
a miner verifies a block, the secure mapping layer should
be generated based on the previous block hash(Line 1) and
insert to the trained model (Line 2). The testing accuracy is
then calculated based on the released test data (Line3). If
the test accuracy is greater than the required accuracy then
the block pass the verification (Line 4-8).
When the training data is completed before the specified
time and the accuracy is up to the standard, if more then
one block is verified at the same time, the first effective block
received will be considered as the winner, and the remaining
blocks will be considered as the ommer block. When the
training time exceeds the maximum completion time, the
block with the highest accuracy is considered as the winner,
in this case, there is no ommer block.
3.3 Data Structure of Blocks
The block consists of header and body which is compara-
ble with the data structure in BitCoin. Block header con-
tains block ID, winner’s ID, selected task, previous block
Algorithm 2: VerifyBlock (blk, PHS, train_data)
Input: blk: received new block
train_data: the training dataset
train_blk: the test data block
PHS: the hash value of the previous block
Output: verified: True or False
1 SMLayer ← CreateSMLayer(PHS)
2 sm_model ← InsertLayer(task.model, SMLayer)
3 train_accuracy ← CalcAccuracy(sm_model, train_data)
4 if train_accuracy ≥ required_accuracy then
5 if blk.secure_mapping = PHS and blk.timestamp <
test_blk.timestamp then
6 return verified = True
7 end
8 end
9 return verified = False
hash, trained model(TM), model’s training accuracy , ommer
block’s hash and the hash of the Merkle Tree root. Block
body stores data organized in a Merkle Tree, and these data
include the list of uncompleted tasks in the previous block,
the list of newly collected tasks, the encrypted data uploaded
by the user and transactions and test data set for solved task.
3.4 Secure Data Storage and Secure Mapping
Layers
We design an encryption mechansim to prevent malicious
nodes from starting training before other nodes. We follow
inner-product functional encryption [1] and propose a method
for the data node to upload data after encryption and the
consensus nodes to access the inner product between data
feature x and an arbitrary vector z.
Formally, we consider an 𝑑-dimensional feature vector
x ∈ R𝑑 to be encrypted and stored. The data functional
encryption and decryption process can be described in three
steps:
Step 1: Key generation. We have access to a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm GroupGen(𝜆), which returns a
triplet G, 𝑝, 𝑔. G is a cyclic group of order 𝑝 that is generated
by 𝑔 ∈ G, where 𝑝 is a 𝜆-bit prime number.
Simply put, the cyclic group G is a set of 𝑝 elements
associated with a multiplicative operation ×. Letting 𝑔× 𝑔 =
𝑔2, the group can be written as G = {1, 𝑔, 𝑔2, . . . , 𝑔𝑝−1}. The
group is cyclic because 𝑔𝑝−1×𝑔 = 1 and 1×𝑔 = 𝑔. Since every
element in G is a multiple of 𝑔, we say the group is generated
by 𝑔. We let Z𝑝 denote the index set {0, 1, . . . , 𝑝− 1}, which
defines the range of integers that can be represented in this
encryption scheme. Further, we let Z𝐷𝑝 denote the set of
𝐷-dimensional vectors whose components are in Z𝑝.
The Decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) assumption forms
the basis of this encryption scheme. Let 𝒰G denote the uni-
form probability distribution over G. The DDH assumption
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states that if 𝑔𝑎 and 𝑔𝑏 are i.i.d. sampled from 𝒰G, the dis-
tribution of 𝑔𝑎𝑏 is computationally indistinguishable from
𝒰G.
We are now ready to generate two keys, a master public key
h used in encryption, and a master public key s used for de-
cryption. We first randomly draw s = 𝑠1, 𝑠2, . . . , 𝑠𝐷 from Z𝐷𝑝 .
The master public key is generated as h = 𝑔𝑠1 , 𝑔𝑠2 , . . . , 𝑔𝑠𝐷 ).
Step 2: Data encryption. Since we can only encode integers
in Z𝐷𝑝 , we first discretize the floating-point vector x ∈ R𝐷
into an integer vector x˜ ∈ Z𝐷𝑝 . With the master public key
h, we encrypt x˜ as follows. We choose a random 𝑟 ∈ Z𝑝
and compute 𝑐𝑡0 = 𝑔𝑟. After that, for each component ?˜?𝑖
(𝑖 ∈ 1, 𝐷) of ?˜?, we compute the ciphertext 𝑐𝑡𝑖 = ℎ𝑟𝑖 · 𝑔?˜?𝑖 .
At the end of this step, we have encrypted ?˜? as a 𝐷 + 1-
dimensional ciphertext ct = 𝑐𝑡0, 𝑐𝑡1, . . . , 𝑐𝑡𝐷. The ciphertext,
instead of x , is broadcast to the entire BCN.
Step 3: Query vector generation. In order to maintain the
data integrity of the blockchain, at every consensus node,
a set of query vectors {z𝑖}𝐼𝑖=1 are generated from the hash
of the previous block (PHS) and the Merkle root of the
current block . When a trained NN model is being verified
by other consensus nodes, the query vectors are generated
again (see Algorithm 2). Models that do not use the correct
query vectors can thus be identified and discarded.
Algorithm 3 shows the detailed procedure. The query
vectors are generated through switching different number of
bits in the XOR operation (Line 3 of Algorithm 3). This
deterministic procedure reinforces the data security of the
blockchain, so that no consensus node can start training in
advance.
Step 4: Inner-product-based decryption. In decryption, a
consensus node does not recover x˜ . Instead, the consensus
node finds the inner product ⟨x˜ ,z⟩ for the predefined query
vectors z ∈ R𝐷. The inner product ⟨x˜ ,z⟩ is computed as
log𝑔
(︁
𝑗∈1, 𝑐𝑡
𝑧𝑗
𝑗 𝑐𝑡
𝜂
0
)︁
, where η equals ⟨s,z⟩.
Proposition 3.1. The formula log𝑔
(︁
𝑗∈1,𝐷 𝑐𝑡
𝑧𝑗
𝑗 𝑐𝑡
𝜂
0
)︁
finds
the inner product between x˜ and z.
Proof.
log𝑔
(︂
𝑗∈1,𝑑
𝑐𝑡
𝑧𝑗
𝑗 𝑐𝑡
𝜂𝑖
0
)︂
= log𝑔
(︂
𝑗∈1,𝑑
𝑔𝑠𝑗𝑟+?˜?𝑗 𝑧𝑗𝑔𝑟 𝑗∈1,𝑑 𝑧𝑗𝑠𝑗
)︂
= log𝑔
(︁
𝑔𝑗∈1,𝑑 𝑧𝑗𝑠𝑗𝑟+𝑗∈1,𝑑 𝑧𝑗 ?˜?𝑗−𝑟 𝑗∈1,𝑑 𝑧𝑗𝑠𝑗
)︁
= log𝑔 𝑔
Σ𝑗∈1,𝑑𝑧𝑗 ?˜?𝑗
= log𝑔 𝑔
⟨x˜ ,z⟩
= ⟨x˜ ,z⟩
(1)
In practice, the consensus node employs 𝐿 query vectors
{z𝑖}𝐼𝑖=1 to derive 𝐿 inner products, which become input
features to the neural network. This is implemented as a
neural network layer that is positioned before other layers
Figure 3: An Example of a Neural Network Model with a
Secure Mapping Layer
and remain unchanged during training. Figure 3 shows an
example of a neural network model with a secure mapping
layer.
Convolutional Secure Mapping Layer. Commonly used in
computer vision, convolutional neural networks (CNNs) uti-
lize spatial information to make predictions. Visualization
of network weights [25] suggests that CNNs incrementally
aggregate regional features from lower layers to create more
informative features at higher layers. However, global projec-
tions in the SML layer remove spatial information in input
images. This led to poor performance in preliminary experi-
ments.
To mitigate this problem, we propose Convolutional Secure
Mapping Layer (CSML) that employs the generated query
vectors as convolutional filters that are applied while sliding
across the entire image. We use zero paddings around the
image to maintain the height and width of the original image.
Data augmentation operations like random cropping and
horizontal flip can still be applied after CSML. We separately
apply convolutional filters to each of the RGB channels, so
that the popular color jittering augmentation can be applied
using multiplicative factors on the output of CSML. More
specifically, we create 𝐿 convolutional filters for each color
channel. As a result, each color channel is transformed to 𝐿
channels, yielding 3𝐿 channels in the output.
3.5 Discussion: Incentives and Security
A blockchain based on the PoLe algorithm functions like
a platform on which the data nodes post machine learning
tasks for given rewards and the consensus nodes compete for
them.
The PoLe design encouranges the data node to accurately
estimate the time it takes to complete the training and pro-
vide proportional reward. A data node may be tempted to
intentionally overestimate the time limit in order to make
consensus nodes to do more work for the same reward. How-
ever, under the current mechanism design, this will lead to
low task priority. On the other hand, underestimating the
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Algorithm 3: Secure Mapping Layers Generation
Input: PHS: decimal hash value
D: dimension of encrypted data
I: input dimension of the neural network
k: the number of bits for each weight
Output: {z𝑖}𝐼𝑖=1: the set of 𝐼 query vectors
1 for 𝑖 from 1 to I do
2 bPHS ← ToBinary(PHS)
3 primary_weight ← XOR(bPHS, bPHS ≪ 𝑖)
4 master_weight ← primary_weight
5 while # bits of master_weight < 𝑘𝐷 do
6 master_weight ← Append (master_weight,
primary_weight)
7 end
8 for 𝑗 from 1 to D do
9 z𝑖𝑗 ← ToInteger( master_weight [j(k-1) : jk] )
10 end
11 end
12 return {z1,z2, . . . ,z𝐼}
training time could lead to high task priority but will cause
training to terminate prematurely, yielding poor-performing
models.
Once a node generates a winning block, it will receive
the reward gave by the data node and a fixed reward issued
by the blockchain system 𝑅𝑤. In addition, it can also get
rewards by referring previous ommer blocks. Those producers
of ommer blocks can also get rewards when winning blocks
refer their ommer blocks. A winning block can only reference
the ommer block with the highest test accuracy. The rewards
for the ommer generator is 𝑅𝑟 as calculated below.
𝑅𝑟 = 𝑅𝑤𝐻𝑤 −𝐻𝑜 *𝑂𝑛𝑢𝑚, (2)
Where 𝐻𝑤 stands for the height of the winning block, 𝐻𝑜
stands for the height of the ommer block and 𝑂𝑛𝑢𝑚 is the
number of ommer blocks in the height of 𝐻𝑜.
Since all training data are available, a malicious consensus
node may start training before other nodes in order to gain
an unfair advantage. The SML is designed to prevent this
behavior. As the SML weights are computed from the hash
value of the previous block and not broadcast to the BCN, a
network that does not use the correct hash cannot generate
valid blocks and receive rewards. In addition, consensus nodes
cannot cheat by training the model on the test data because
any model that is broadcast after the release of the test data
will be rejected.
In PoLe, a new block contains the hash of the previous
block, which forces the attackers to recalculate all blocks after
the modified block. This design increases the cost for attackers
in manipulating the data in our system and enhances the
system security. PoLe maps the hash of the previous block
to fixed weights of secure mapping layers of secure model
in current block by the Algorithm 3. In Algorithm 3, a 𝑘-
bit sequence is generated based on the previous block hash.
This ensures that each element in ct can be assigned a 𝑘-bit
number ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2𝑘 − 1} from the primary weight from
an XOR operation. Based on this, the weights from previous
block hash can be considered to be randomly initialized. Once
the previous block changes, the hash value will be different,
and the trained model will be different. We assume that
the most of the features of data are preserved in the results
of the inner-product of data and weights, which means the
performance of the two models is similar. This hypothesis is
verified in the experiments in the following section.
4 EXPERIMENTS
The purpose of our experiments is to evaluate the efficiency
and effectiveness of the proposed blockchain system with
PoLe. We carry out three sets of experiments. The first
experiment is designed to verify if PoLe can reliably control
the amount of time between the creation of two sequential
blocks in comparison with PoW. If a blockchain system can
generate blocks at regular intervals, transactions carried out
through the system will not experience unexpected delays,
improving the smoothness of user experience.
The second experiment compares the accuracy of deep
learning model trained from a PoLe-based blockchain system
and traditional method for training neural network models.
This experiment aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the
model trained on encrypted data and examine the training
accuracy based on PoLe.
The third experiment is to study the effect of the same
data on the accuracy when using SML inconsistent with
the training. This experiment is used to study whether it is
possible to forge workload by stealing other trained models
and replacing them with their own SML.
4.1 Datasets
In these experiments we utilize three datasets, MNIST, IRIS,
and CIFAR-10. The MNIST dataset represents an optical
digit recognition task from black-and-white images. We follow
the original split of 60,000 images for training and 10,000
images for testing. The IRIS dataset is a classification task
with 3 classes and 150 data samples. We divide the data into
a 90% training set and 10% test set. Finally, CIFAR-10 is an
image classification task with 10 classes for 32× 32 images.
The training data contain 60,000 images and the test set
contains 10,000 images.
4.2 Experiment 1: Variance in Block Generation
Time
When a blockchain-based distributed ledger is used to support
financial transactions, an important performance indicator is
the consistency in the number of transactions that the ledger
can record per unit of time. This is directly reflected in the
average time it takes to generate a block and the variance
in that time. A blockchain with a high variance in block
generation time may lead to poor user experience because
users may need to wait a long time before their trasactions
are recognized by the chain. In this experiment, we create a
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simulation to test the variance in block generation time on
PoW and PoLe chains.
We build two blockchains using PoW consensus and PoLe
consensus respectively. For the PoLe chain, we employ 5 data
providers and 3 consensus nodes. The number of consensus
nodes in PoW and our PoLe are set to be the same as 3. The
expected time of generating a new block in PoW system is set
to 300 seconds. Similarly, in the PoLe blockchain, we set the
training accuracy threshold to 0.8 so that the exepcted time
for a single model to complete training is close to 300 seconds.
Both blockchains are run until 50 blocks are generated. We
record the time it takes to generate every block.
Figure 4: Block Generation Time of PoW and PoLe
Table 1: Statistics of Block Generation Time (in Seconds)
algorithm average max min variance
PoLe 222.64 247.65 203.50 140.28
PoW 293.72 1498.0 3.0 130548.84
The resulted block generation times of PoLe and PoW
are shown in Figure 4 and the statistics are summarized
in Table 1. We observe that PoLe has a much lower vari-
ance in block generation time than PoW. The reason behind
this observation is that the stochastic gradient descent algo-
rithm that optimizes the neural network is highly consistent
in convergence speed, despite its apparent stochasticity. In
contrast, due to the properities of a well-behaving hash func-
tion, whether a PoW guess of the nonce succeeds follows a
high-variance distribution.
The reader may notice that, in this simulation, we use the
same machine learning problem repeatedly. We emphasize
that the miners cannot reuse a network trained for previous
tasks as the solution to a new task because the new task’s
data have been encrypted using the hash of the previous
block and the Secure Mapping Layer. The feature prevents
“gun jumping” or solution reuse and ensures the reward from
the consensus is fairly allocated.
4.3 Experiment 2: Accuracy of Secure DL
Training
We introduce the SML in order to prevent cheating behav-
iors. However, the SML may lower the performance of the
neural network because the data have been projected onto
some random directions. In this experiment, we measure the
performance difference between secure networks with SMLs
and unsecure networks without SMLs.
We create two neural networks, a multi-layer perceptron
(MLP), and the VGG-16 network [19]. For both networks,
we create a secure version with a SML inserted before the
first layer, and an unsecure model without SMLs. On the
MNIST dataset, the value of 𝑘 in Algorithm 3 is set to 3.
The output dimension of Secure Mapping Layers is set to 128
for MLP and 256 for VGG-16. The number of query vector
is set to 32 for MLP and 64 for VGG-16. In addition, we
test an MLP model on the simple IRIS dataset. The above
models are trained for 400 epochs. Finally, we train VGG-16
on CIFAR-10 for 120 epochs with the SML output dimension
set to 2700.
Figures 5 and 6 show the training accuracy and testing
accuracy curves of MLP and VGG-16 on MNIST, respectively.
Table 2 reports final accuracy and the elapsed time. We
observe both the secure and the unsecure models are trained
to similar performance, and that the introduction of SML
does not hinder model performance. We observe a small
increase in the time needed for the secure models to complete
the same number of epochs. The time needed to complete
400 epochs increased by 29% for MLP and by 21% for VGG-
16. This phenomenon is expected as the SML layer brings
additional computational complexity and could be mitigated
with more efficient implementations.
Figure 8 shows the training and test accuracy curves of the
MLP on the IRIS dataset. Figure 7 shows the curves of VGG-
16 on CIFAR-10. Similar to earlier experiments, we observe
very similar performance for models with and without the
SML.
Overall, we conclude that despite the input features being
projected onto different directions, the SML does not harm
predictive performance significantly.
4.4 Experiment 3: Effects of Inconsistent SML
on Predictive Performance
A consensus node may be encourage to reuse a model by
replacing the Secure Mapping Layer. For example, after a
trained model has been broadcast to other nodes, another
node may replace the SML layer and submit the solution
as its own. Similarly, if a consensus node realizes the data
node is re-issuing an old task, it may attempt to replace the
SML in an old solution and resubmit it. Therefore, we set to
empirically study the predictive accuracy of a trained model
for the same data when the SML layer has been replaced.
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Figure 5: Training and Test Accuracy Curves of the Original and the Secure MLP Models on MNIST.
Figure 6: Training and Test Accuracy Curves of the Original and the Secure VGG-16 Models on MNIST.
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Figure 7: The Accuracy Comparison of Original (Left) and Secure (Right) MLP Models for IRIS Data Set
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Figure 8: The Accuracy Comparison of Original(Left) and Secure(Right) VGG-16 Models for CIFAR-10 Data Set
Table 2: Accuracy and time needed for 400 epochs of the MLP
and VGG-16 models
model type accuracy(%) time cost(min)
MNIST MLP secure 99.90 14.55
original 99.52 11.26
MNIST VGG secure 99.70 78.56
original 99.93 64.51
CIFAR10 VGG secure 91.25 93.41
original 91.70 71.28
IRIS MLP secure 100 5.14
original 100 3.25
Table 3: Model accuracy using original SML and replaced
SML
model accuracy(%)
Model + Origin SML 99.50
Model + Replaced SML 13.48
We use the MNIST data set and measure the performance
of the model trained in Experiment 2, as well as a the model
with a replaced SML. Table 3 shows the accuracy of the
two models. We can find that the accuracy of the model for
the same data set is reduced by 86.02% when the SML is
replaced. This demonstrates that replacing the SML from a
model after training will result in intolerable performance
degradation, which allows the BCN to detect cheating easily.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Rapid progress in deep learning has created an unsatisfied de-
mand for computation power. PoW-based Blockchain systems
can effectively ensure data security at the cost of waiting huge
computer resources. Starting from the realization that the
training and testing of a machine learning model have asym-
metric computational demands, we propose a new consen-
sus algorithm called PoLe, which channels otherwise wasted
compute on blockchain to the practical benefits of training
machine learing models. We further designed mechanisms
to prevent malicious participants from gaming the system
and collecting undue rewards. Together, the proposed system
achieves data integrity, defends against malicious behaviors,
and does not negatively impact the predictive performance of
trained models. Experimental results confirm that (1) PoLe
is capable of producing a reliable stream of blocks, which
support responsive data storage in a decentralized manner,
and (2) the security mechanism of PoLe does not sacrifice
model performance. As neural network powered AI appli-
cations and blockchain networks continue to grow in the
foreseeable future, we believe the PoLe consensus mechanism
will contribute to meeting their demands for compute and
reducing environmental impact from energy consumption.
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